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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20090148-CA

vs.
JULLYN DOYLE,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate-review jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (2009).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment

when the State's attorneys committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct what
was perjured testimony by a material witness. (R. 473: 304; 395). A trial court's
decision regarding a defendant's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, ^ 10, 69 P.3d 1278.
"This standard is met if 'the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result
for the defendant.'" Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 10 (internal quotations omitted). And the
"overriding concern is that defendant received a fair trial." pritchett 2003 UT 24, ^f 10.
This issue was preserved in arguments made during trial (R. 473: 304-) and in a motion
to arrest judgment (R. 395, 373-71).
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2.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing prior bad acts of Doyle involving drug

use to be admitted as evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. The trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad
acts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^f 24, 52
P.3d 1194; see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 18, 993 P.2d 837. This issue was
preserved in a written motion and in oral arguments to the trial court (R. 114-12, 474: 3-).

CONTROLLING CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jullyn Doyle appeals from a jury's conviction of possession of a controlled
substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and
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possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37a-5(l) before the Honorable Darold J. McDade of the Fourth District Court.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition of the Case
The State charged Defendant by Information, dated July 6, 2007, with one count
of Possession or Use of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and one count of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l). (R. 1). Subsequent to the preliminary hearing held on October 15,
2007, the trial court found probable cause and bound both charges over for trial. (R. 3941). Defendant entered pleas of not guilty on both counts. (R. 39-41).
Defendant filed a Demand for 404(b) Evidence on November 15, 2007. (R. 44).
At the pre-trial conference, the parties discussed issues regarding discovery and evidence
to be presented at trial. (R. 471). Defendant notified the court and filed a Motion in
Limine regarding the admission of hearsay statements and the exclusion of possible Rule
404(b) evidence. (R. 471: 6-12; 101-02). The following day, December 4, 2007, the
State filed its Notice of Intent to introduce 404(b) evidence at trial. (R. 110). That same
day, however, Defendant and the State stipulated to continuing the trial because results of
a fingerprint test may not have been available by trial. (R. 117).
On December 20, 2007, the State filed its response to Defendant's Request for
Discovery and Specific Discovery and its Memorandum iq Opposition to Defendant's
Motion in Limine on December 21, 2007. (R. 196; 201). The State then filed its
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Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine [To Exclude] Prior Bad and Defendant filed
her Reply. (R. 210; 221). On February 4, 2008, at oral argument on Defendant's Motion
in Limine regarding possible Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court denied Defendant's
motion. (R. 474). Defendant filed a Notice of Petition for Permission to Appeal From
the trial court's Interlocutory Order on March 18, 2008. (R. 247). That Petition was
ultimately denied by this Court on May 2, 2008. (R. 254).
At pre-trial conference on June 23, 2008, the trial court granted Defendant's
motion to sever Defendant's case from her co-defendant, Jorge Lopez-Navarette and the
final pre-trial conference was set for September 15, 2008. (R. 260-262). On September
15, 2008 the State filed an amended Information, modifying count one to Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and count two to Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l). (R. 288).
Defendant filed her Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of a 2007 DUI and an
associated crime lab report. (R. 294). That motion was denied the morning of trial on
September 24, 2008. (R. 312). On September 25th, the second day of trial, Defendant
submitted a written Motion to Dismiss. (R. 313-321). That motion was discussed in
chambers and denied. (R. 326). The jury convicted Defendant of both counts of the
Information as charged. (R. 322-26).
Defendant filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment and sentencing is continued to
January 12, 2009. (R. 395; 373-71). On January 12, 2009, the trial court addressed
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Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and sentencing. (R. 444-48). The trial court
denied Defendant's motion. (R. 444-48).
Doyle was sentenced according to statute on each count, but the prison/jail time
was suspended except for 90 days to run consecutive with any other commitments, thirtysix months supervised probation and a fine of $975.00. (R. 444-48). Defendant filed a
timely Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2008. (R. 460).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Testimony of Brandon Johnson
Brandon Johnson is a deputy with the Utah County Sheriffs Office and is also a
member of the Utah County Metro SWAT team (R. 472: 126, 127). On June 28, 2007 he
participated with the SWAT team on the execution of a no-knock, nighttime search
warrant inside a trailer (R. 472: 132).
The team deployed two audio distraction devices outside the residence before
entering the trailer (R. 472: 133). Johnson was the last one "through the door" (R. 472:
133). He walked into the living room, saw a small child and picked her up (R. 472: 135).
They were momentarily attacked by a pit bull before he toc>k the child outside (R. 472:
135).
Outside he tried to calm the child down, letting her know they were police officers
and that she was safe (R. 472: 135-36).
B. Testimony of Shantel Cuenca

5

Shantel Cuenca is an inmate at the Utah State Prison, serving a sentence for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (R. 472: 142).
In June of 2007 she was living in a trailer in Springville (R. 472: 142). She lived
with

approximately

six

other

individuals

(R. 472:

143-44).

Cuenca

sold

methamphetamine out of the residence beginning in February of 2007 (R. 472: 145-46).
On the night of June 28, 2007 she was at home with approximately 13-14 other people
(R. 472: 143). One of her daughters was also present at that time (R. 472: 149).
That night there was a "raid" and police kicked down her doors and entered the
trailer (R. 472: 146). At the time she was in the back bedroom (R. 472: 146). She had
just finished selling "some stuff and was smoking methamphetamine on her bed with
"Nikki (Leticia)..., Jullyn and George (Jorge Navarette)" (R. 472: 147. 148). That night
she had sold some drugs to Nikki (R. 472: 160-61).
When asked if she saw Jullyn, the defendant, smoke meth, she said, "As I recall,
yes" (R. 472: 148). There was a methamphetamine pipe that everybody smoked from,
including Doyle (R. 472: 158-59, 164). Cuenca testified that Doyle had purchased
methamphetamine from her before (R. 472: 151).
When the noise distractions went off, everybody "hit" the floor (R. 472: 151).
Cuenca grabbed the methamphetamine, which was out in the open on a little refrigerator
next to her bed (R. 472: 151-52, 162). She also had drugs underneath her mattress and in
her purse (R. 472: 152).
Sometime during the search, Cuenca heard an officer mention a "bag that was in
between Jullyn and George" (R. 472: 153). Drugs were also discovered inside a Doritos
6

bag on her bed (R. 472: 153-54). Cuenca testified she "had no clue what was in [the
bag], but [she] claimed everything in the home" (R. 472: 153). Later she testified that the
Doritos bag belonged to an individual who was on the porch at the time of the raid (R.
472: 162).
Cuenca told police that Doyle was at the residence to "pick up my daughter" (R.
472: 155). Cuenca acknowledged testifying earlier at the preliminary hearing (R. 472:
155). At that time she testified again that Doyle was there to "pick up my five-year-old
daughter" and that Doyle was "back in my room to pick up some money for me" (R. 472:
156).

She did not mention that Doyle was smoking methamphetamine at that time

because "no one asked" (R. 472: 156, 169). She also testified that she could not recall
police asking if anyone was smoking at the time the warrant was executed (R. 472: 162).
Cuenca testified that she was convicted of possession with intent to distribute in
this case and in another case (R. 472: 157). In addition, the following exchange occurred
between Cuenca and one of the prosecutors, Ryan Peters:
PETERS:

Were you ever given a deal on your charges for—in exchange for

your testimony today?
CUENCA:

No.

PETERS:

Has anyone ever asked you to testify in a specific way?

CUENCA:

No, I always told everybody I wouldn't jie

(R.472: 158).
A similar exchange occurred on cross-examination:
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DODD:

And it's your testimony that the State didn't offer you a deal to

testify against Ms. Doyle?
CUENCA:

Nope.

DODD:

You've been convicted since then?

CUENCA:

I have....

DODD:

How many separate inc—at least two separate incidences that

you've been convicted for felonies?
CUENCA:

Yes.

DODD:

What were those incidents?

CUENCA:

Well, no, there's been three....

DODD:

... Did you take deals on those, or did you take those to trial like

we're doing today?
CUENCA:

Nope, I'm on a five to life.

DODD:

So you actually took a deal, you pled guilty?

CUENCA:

Yeah, pled guilty to them.

DODD:

All right, and the State didn't offer you a deal at that time?

CUENCA:

Nope.

DODD:

Okay. So you're doing this just—why are you testifying today?

CUENCA:

Everyone's askng me to.

DODD:

Who's "everyone"?

CUENCA:

The prosecutor, you

(R. 472: 166-68).
8

C. Testimony of John Barson
Provo City Police Officer John Barson is currently assigned to the Utah County
Major Crimes Task Force (R. 472: 176). Although he hasj received past training in the
area of drug recognition, he is not currently certified as a Drug Recognition Expert (R.
472: 176).
In June of 2007 he was also assigned to the task force and was investigating
Shantel Cuenca in regards to possible drug trafficking (R. 472: 179, 216). He conducted
surveillance on her home in Springville and eventually served a search warrant on her
residence at approximately 11 p.m. on June 28, 2007 with assistance from the Utah
County SWAT team (R. 472: 180, 182).
He entered the trailer after it had been secured (R. 472: 182-83). Three other
individuals were in the master bedroom seated on the bed—including Cuenca, Nikki and
a male (Jorge) (R. 472: 187, 190). Located on the floor between Doyle and Jorge was a
small, clear plastic baggie that contained methamphetamine (R. 472: 188, 190). It was
"within inches of her foot" (R. 472: 190).
There was a "strange chemical odor in the air" of the master bedroom (R. 472:
195). Barson testified that he associated the smell with freihly burnt methamphetamine
(R. 472: 195, 196). Doyle objected to this testimony and requested information as to
Barson's training in regards to methamphetamine and its odor (R. 472: 195). Barson
testified that he attended a 60-hour training in how methamphetamine is made, and that in
addition, he has "been in numerous homes and vehicles Where methamphetamine was
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being or had just been smoked; and this was similar to those odors" (R. 472: 196). He
also testified that the air was hazy (R. 472: 196).
Drugs and paraphernalia were also found on the bed between the mattress and the
box springs, on a night stand in the room (pipe or bong), on Cuenca's person, and in a
Doritos bag on the bed (R. 472: 197). Barson also saw a fragment of a glass meth pipe
with residue on it on the floor of the master bedroom (R. 472: 198). Cuenca claimed
ownership of the drugs except for "the stuff on the floor" (R. 473: 247).
Barson subsequently interviewed Doyle in one of the other bedrooms (R. 472:
203). Barson testified she was "extremely confrontational, very verbally aggressive";
and she was physically agitated (R. 472: 203, 204). She was moving constantly and had
a "very loud voice, yelling, a lot of—a lot of mannerisms and physical attributes of
someone that may have been under the influence of a central nervous stimulant like
methamphetamine" (R. 472: 204). Doyle objected to this last testimony and asked that it
be stricken because Barson was not qualified to make such an assumption in regards to
being a drug recognition expert (DRE) (R. 472: 204). The trial court sustained the
objection and ordered that statement stricken (R. 472: 204).
Barson terminated the interview due to her behavior.

However, Doyle

subsequently asked to speak with him approximately 30 minutes later (R. 472: 205).
Doyle told him that "she knew that there was methamphetamine in that bedroom. She
stated... that she knew it was being prepared to be consumed" (R. 472: 206). Doyle also
told him that she was there to pick up Cuenca's children (R. 472: 207). Doyle also
denied that the methamphetamine and paraphernalia belonged to her (R. 472: 211).
10

On the second day of trial, Barson also testified (R. 473: 233-). Barson testified
that he had arrested "hundreds" of individuals in DUI an4 possession cases who were
later confirmed to have been on methamphetamine while he observed them (R. 473: 23435). Doyle again objected to this testimony (R. 473: 235). The trial court again sustained
the objection (R. 473: 236-37). However, Barson was subsequently allowed to testify to
the physical manifestations or behaviors of individuals under the influence of
methamphetamine or other central nervous system stimulants: "constant movement, lots
of hands gestures. There's bruxism, which is flexing the muscles in the jaw, grinding of
the teeth, constant talking, loud voice, aggressive, assertive behavior that's not normal,
physically aggressive behavior" (R. 473: 238). Barson also testified over objection that
Doyle "was verbally aggressive, physically animated.

She exhibited many of the

symptoms that I, per my experience, have associated with methamphetamine use" (R.
473: 240). Barson concluded there was no need to obtaih a blood draw from Doyle
because it was "obvious" that she "was under the influence of methamphetamine at that
time" (R. 473: 241).
D. Testimony of Roy Edwards
Officer Roy Edwards assisted Barson with the execution of the search warrant (R.
473: 256). He was assigned to search the master bedroom (R. 473: 257). He found four
people sitting on the bed, all in custody (R. 473: 258). He also immediately noticed a
meth pipe, and a little baggie of meth on the floor (R. 473: 258).
methamphetamine was also found on Cuenca's person (R. 473: 259).

A bag of
Cuenca also

informed the officers there was more meth in a Doritos b^g on the bed (R. 473: 261).
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After the four individuals were taken to another room, Edwards fund cash and more bags
of methamphetamine under the mattress (R. 473: 262). He testified that the Doritos bag
and the meth on the floor were within Doyle's reach (R. 473: 267).
E. Testimony of Dennis Chapman
Utah County Sheriffs Deputy Dennis Chapman testified that on February 9, 2006
he initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Doyle (FL 473: 271). He found her
behavior—nervousness, twitching, shaking, inability to sit still—suspicious and so he
questioned her about methamphetamine use (R. 473: 272-73). Chapman testified that
Doyle admitted to using "meth recently" and that "she couldn't afford to purchase meth
on her own. So she smoked meth whenever she got a chance" (R. 473: 273). Urine and
blood samples were obtained from Doyle at that time and methamphetamine was found
to be in her system (R. 473: 273-74).
F. Testimony of Anna Shide
Anna Shide is a forensic scientist with the Bureau of Forensic Toxicology (R. 473:
285). She testified that she tested a blood sample collected from Doyle on August 29,
2007 that was positive for methamphetamine (R. 473: 291-93).
G. Testimony of Gunda Jarvis
Gunda Jarvis testified that she was Shantel Cuenca's court appointed attorney (R.
473: 336-37). Defense Exhibits 1 (Fourth District Case Number 081401181) and 2
(Fourth District Case Number 081401078) are Cuenca's Statements Before Pleading
Guilty in the cases Jarvis represented her (R. 473: 341, 344-45). In Exhibit 1, Cuenca
was originally charged with a first degree felony that was reduced to a second degree
12

felony (R. 473: 343).l In Exhibit 2, Count I was amended to a first degree without
mandatory prison time (R. 273: 346).

Cuenca also admitted to Count III (false

information, a class C misdemeanor) and the remaining charge was dismissed (R. 473:
345, 346). In each case, a condition of the plea agreement, entered into on May 5, 2008,
Cuenca agreed to testify against Doyle (R. 473: 345; Defense Exhibits 1 and 2). Jarvis
testified that if Cuenca was to testify that she did not receive a deal in exchange for her
testimony against Doyle, that would be false (R. 473: 348).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the Utah and Federal Constitutions, criminal defendants are entitled to due
process of law, in that their right to a fair trial is inviolable. Here, Defendant asserts that
the State's actions at trial, but also throughout the proceedings, fundamentally impaired
her right to a fair trial and the trial court erred by abusing its discretion in not granting
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment because of the State's conduct.
Although the State is "charged with vigorously enforcing the laws... [it has an]
even higher duty to see that justice is done." State v. Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah
1981). Thus, the State "may strike hard blows" in order to see that justice is done; it may
not, however, "strike foul ones." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ 31, 992 P.2d 951.
Here, the State struck foul blows.

1

The court docket for this case also shows that two charges were dismissed: possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony; and possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor.
13

First, and foremost, the State failed in its duty to correct false testimony. Here, the
State's material witness - Shantel Cuenca - testified that Defendant had unlawfully
consumed a controlled substance because she was involved in the unlawful activity too.
However, during direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Ms. Cuenca about
whether she had received any plea deals for her testimony. Ms. Cuenca answered no.
Coincidentally, however, Ms. Cuenca had in fact received a plea deal, specifically in
exchange for her testimony against Defendant. And, the prosecutor - Mr. Ryan Peters was fully aware of this fact because he had authorized Ms. Cuenca's plea deal. Despite
Mr. Peter's knowledge that Ms. Cuenca's testimony regarding the plea deal was false, he
failed to correct it. Thus, Mr. Peters committed prosecutorial misconduct in failing in his
duty to correct patently false testimony.
Second, the State failed to disclose crucial evidence within a reasonable time
before trial. Several months before trial, defense counsel specifically requested that the
State provide evidence of any plea offers to any co-defendants, which included Ms.
Cuenca. At the time of the request, no offer was made to Ms. Cuenca. However, when
the offer was eventually made, the State failed in its duty to provide what is obviously
exculpatory, or at the very least, mitigating impeachment evidence.
In addition, this Court should reverse Doyle's conviction based on the trial court's
error in admitting evidence of other bad acts under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. The other acts were not admitted for appropriate non-character
purposes. They were admitted to establish character which conforms with the actions
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alleged in the current case, and their prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any
probative value.

ARGUMENT
I.

In Failing to Grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss After the State's
Attorneys Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct by Failing to Correct False
Testimony, the Trial Court Abused its Discretion
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not granting Defendant's

Motion to Arrest Judgment, which was based on the State's offering of and failure to
correct perjured testimony by a material witness - Shantel Cuenca.

Accordingly,

Defendant will show that the standard of review, which is high in that it requires an abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court, is satisfied here. State v Pritchett 2003 UT 24,

1110.
Consequently, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the case
based on the trial court's abuse of discretion for not granting Defendant's motion to
dismiss in light of the State's blatant and unethical misconduct, which substantially
impaired the Defendant's Due Process right to a fair trial. See, U.S. Const. Amend. V;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7, see also, Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, \ 38 n. 7, 125 P.3d 917
("a court must dismiss a case with prejudice in instances where prosecutorial misconduct
is so severe that lesser sanctions could not result in a fair triall.").
A.

The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Consciously Failing to
Correct the False Testimony of Shantel Cuenca, a Material Witness

15

a

[W]hen a prosecutor is aware that testimony is false, he or she has a duty to

correct the false impression; failure to do so requires reversal 'if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" State
v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 116 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (quoting Walker v. State, 624 P.2d
687, 690 (Utah 1981)). And, as this Court added, "[t]his applies even if the prosecutor
unwittingly introduced the false testimony...." Gordon, 886 P.2d at 116. Here, the State
relied on patently false testimony and failed to correct it, which in turn could have
affected the judgment of the jury.
The State offered testimony from a material witness which the State knew to be
false and failed to comply with its duty to correct that falsehood. More than one year
before the two-day trial, the preliminary hearing took place. At this hearing, held on
October 15, 2007, the State, represented by Deputy County Attorney Ryan Peters, offered
its evidence. In response to the State's evidence, Defendant called Shantel Cuenca to
testify.

(R. 470: 42).

Ms. Cuenca's testimony was substantially advantageous to

Defendant as to whether she had knowingly possessed a controlled substance.2
Essentially, Ms. Cuenca's testimony was that she was present at the incident involving
Defendant on June 28, 2007; that she had also been charged with criminal offenses
related to the same incident; that at that time she had not made any promises to the State
as part of her plea to testify in this matter; that the drugs found at the home were hers, and
not Defendant's; and that Defendant was at the location because she was the caretaker for

2

The State's theory of possession was that of constructive possession. (R. 341, Jury
Instructions).
16

Ms. Cuenca's children. (R. 470: 43-48). Based on Ms. Qienca's favorable testimony,
defense counsel listed her as a witness for Defendant at trial. (R. 222).
Subsequently, at trial, Ms. Cuenca switched sides and was called by the State as
their witness. On September 24, 2008, the morning of the first day of trial, Mr. Peters
informed defense counsel that Ms. Cuenca had changed her testimony and would be
testifying on the State's behalf (R. 473: 310). Scrambling, due to the surprise change in
testimony, defense counsel immediately called his secretary to get Ms. Cuenca's criminal
background and any plea agreements. (R. 473: 310-311). In that short time defense
counsel found one plea agreement, which he used to impeach Ms. Cuenca. (R. 473: 311).
On May 5, 2008, more than six months prior to trial, Mr. Peters - the same deputy
county attorney - arranged a plea agreement with Ms. Cuenca in exchange for her
testimony against Defendant. (R. 412-13). Specifically, the State has confirmed that
"[t]hrough plea negotiations, Cuenca was allowed to plead guilty to Distribution of a
Controlled Substance with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony...", and in exchange
Defendant agreed "to testify against Jullyn Doyle...." (R. 413). Mr. Peters approved and
signed the Statement in Support of Guilty Plea, which contained this agreement. (R.
413). Mysteriously, however, when Mr. Peters questioned Ms. Cuenca regarding this
plea deal he failed to correct what he must have known to be a false statement.
During the first day of trial the State called Ms. Cuenca to testify. (R. 472: 142158).

It was here, on direct examination, that Mr. Peters failed to correct a false

statement from Ms. Cuenca. Specifically, Mr. Peters questioned Ms. Cuenca as follows:
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Q: Were you ever given a deal on your charges for - in exchange for your
testimony today?
A: No.
Q: Has anyone ever asked you to testify in a specific way?
A: No, I always told everybody that I wouldn't lie.
(R. 472: 158) (emphasis added). Inarguably, Mr. Peters must have known her answers to
be false because he was the prosecutor that gave Ms. Cuenca the plea deal in exchange
for her testimony. And in an effort to get to the truth, defense counsel had a similar
exchange with Ms. Cuenca:
Q: And it's your testimony that the State didn't offer you a deal to testify against
Ms. Doyle?
A: Nope.
Q: ... Did you take deals on those, or did you take those to trial like we're doing
today?
A: Nope, I'm on a five to life.
Q: So you actually took a deal, you pled guilty?
A: Yeah, pled guilty to them.
Q: All right, and the State didn Jt offer you a deal at that time?
A: Nope.
(R. 472: 166-68) (emphasis added). Twice now Ms. Cuenca offered testimony that Mr.
Peters knew to be false, but did nothing to correct it.3

3

Defense counsel waited until the morning of the second deiy of trial in hopes that Mr.
Peters would correct Ms. Cuenca's false testimony. (R. 473: 304-05). In fact, the State
recalled Ms. Cuenca, but again failed to correct the false statement. (R. 473: 305).
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The following morning defense counsel brought the perjury and prosecutorial
misconduct issues before the court. (R. 473: 304). After Arguments on the matter, the
trial court found no misconduct on the State's part and any perjury issues would be for
the jury to hear. (R. 473: 321-22). After being convicted, Defendant filed a Motion to
Arrest Judgment, based on good cause that the State (1) failed to provide exculpatory
evidence and (2) committed prosecutorial misconduct by not correcting false testimony.
(R. 395-388). Defendant's motion was denied. (R. 466-62).
Presently, Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not
granting Defendant's motions due to the extreme nature of the misconduct and because
Ms. Cuenca - being a witness to the events but having made a plea deal with the State in
exchange for her testimony - gave false testimony, which presents a reasonable
likelihood that the judgment of the jury could be affected. See, Gordon, 886 P.3d at 116.
The trial court abused its discretion when it found Ms. Cuenca "may have believed
she actually did not receive a plea deal since she was still sentenced 5 years to life at the
Utah State Prison." (R. 466, 462). Defendant asserts that the trial court's findings with
regards as to whether Ms. Cuenca believed her testimony to be true as irrelevant.4
In its findings regarding Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment, the trial court
addressed the issues on two fronts. First, the court discussed the State's failure to provide
discovery.

(R. 466-62). Second, the court addressed whether Ms. Cuenca perjured

4

The trial court applied the definition of "perjury," under Utah Code Ann. §76-8-502, to
determine whether Ms. Cuenca knowingly lied under oath. What Ms. Cuenca believed,
however, is not determinative of Mr. Peter's misconduct by failing to correct the false
statement.
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herself. Defendant asserts that first, the State's actions in not providing discovery are
reprehensible, and second, the trial court's analysis of Ms. Cuenca's perjury is inapposite
and fails to address Mr. Peters' misconduct.
L

The State's Failure to Comply with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 is
Illustrative of Defendant's Unfair Trial.
First, the impetus for Defendant's unfair trial was the State's refusal to comply

with Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a) requires the prosecutor to provide discovery material to the defendant upon request.
This is a "continuous duty." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 16(b). By Statute, the State is required
to provide defendants with information on a continual basis upon request. Utah R. Crim.
Pro. 16(a)-(b). The Utah Supreme Court, however, has affinned that under the Utah and
Federal Constitutions, "the prosecution has a fundamental duty to disclose material,
exculpatory evidence to the defense in criminal cases." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, Tf32,
37 P.3d 1073 (internal quotations omitted). And that this duty to disclose "applies both
to substantive exculpatory evidence and to that which may be used for impeachment"
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 32 (emphasis added); see also, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83
S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Here, Defendant made that request through a specific
and general discovery request, but never received the information. (R. 48; 46).
On November 15, 2007, the Defendant made a general and specific request for
discovery. (R. 48; 46). Defendant requested that the State produce "[e]vidence known to
the State which tends to negate or mitigate guilt of the accused" and "[a] copy of any and
all written or verbal offers to any co-defendant in this case in exchange for testimony
20

against the Defendant." (R. 48; 46). In response, the State provided discovery to some
requests and objected to others. (R. 196-192). Regarding Defendant's request for a copy
of any offers to co-defendants, the State responded: "To date, no offers have been made
to any codefendants in exchange for testifying against this defendant." (R. 193). That
was submitted December 20, 2007.
However, between December 2007 and September 2008 (the date of trial), a plea
deal had been struck between the State and a co-defendant - Ms. Cuenca. (R. 465).
When Ms. Cuenca entered into the plea agreement - May 5, 2008 - the State failed to
notify Defendant of that material fact until the day of trial. (R. 465). In fact, the State
maintained, even after this issue came to light, that they had no duty to reveal whether the
State had entered into an agreement with a co-defendant. (R. 408-404). This attitude is
symptomatic of the overall problem in this case - a lack of fairness.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that while the State is "charged with
vigorously enforcing the laws..." it has an "even higher duty to see that justice is done."
Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). So, although the State "'may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he
is not at liberty to strike foul ones.'" State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ 31 (quoting
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). To
withhold - whether intentionally or negligently - critical impeachment evidence until the
day of trial is a malfeasance that strikes at the core of a criminal defendant's
constitutional due process right to a fair trial. See, U.S. Cor^st. Amend. V; Utah Const.
Art. I, § 7.
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ii.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Supporting its Conclusions on
the Irrelevant Fact that Ms, Cuenca Believed Her Testimony to be True
Furthermore, the trial court's findings regarding whether Ms. Cuenca believed to

be the truth are inapposite. The trial court's findings state that "the State did not suborn
perjury. 'Perjury' is a 'false material statement under oath or affirmation or swears or
affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and he does not believe the
statement to be true.'" (R. 463) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-502). Using this as a
guide, the trial court concluded that because "Cuenca may have believed she did not
receive a plea deal, the Court cannot conclude that the State suborned perjury." (R. 463).
Whether the State suborned perjury is questionable because innocently the State may not
have been aware that Ms. Cuenca would testify that she had not received a plea deal in
exchange for her testimony. Regardless, the statement was still false. And despite what
Ms. Cuenca believed, Mr. Peters knew differently.
The fact remains that Mr. Peters knew that the statement was objectively false. It
is beyond reproach or dispute that Ms. Cuenca did in fact enter into a plea agreement
approved by Mr. Peters, which required her to testify against Defendant in this matter.
And this occurred about four months prior to trial. Now, whether Mr. Peter's knew Ms.
Cuenca would testify that she had not entered into an agreement is uncertain. What is
certain, however, is that once Mr. Peters asked Ms. Cuenca on direct examination
whether she had been offered a plea deal in exchange for her testimony and she
responded in the negative, Mr. Peters had an affirmative and ethical duty as prosecutor to
correct this false statement. Unfortunately, Mr. Peters failed in that duty.
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In State v. Gordon, the defendant argued that the prosecutor failed to correct false
testimony of two witnesses and their statements regarding the time period of when they
saw the defendant. Gordon, 886 P.2d at 115. On appeal, this Court reasoned that the
record adequately reflected the State's efforts "to correct the record after defense counsel
informed the prosecutor and the trial court" of the error. Gordon, 886 P.2d at 115
(emphasis added). Conversely, here, the State must have been aware from the instant Ms.
Cuenca made her statements that they were false and yet still failed to correct them, even
after having the matter brought before the trial court. (R. 475: 304).
Presently, however, the State's actions are more akin to those in Walker v. State,
624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981). In Walker, the defendant was tried and convicted of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Walker, 624 P.2d at 688.
Subsequently, the defendant became aware of exculpatory evidence which would have
impeached the testimony of two officers. Walker, 624 P.2d at 688-89. On direct and
cross examination the officers testified that no male items were found in the residence,
which would have presented the defendant with a defense to having possessed the
controlled substance. Id. Later, it came to light that the prosecutor knew that the officers
statements were false, yet he failed to correct the statements. Walker, 624 P.2d at 69092.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

"It is an accepted premise in

American jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the knowing use of false
testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of
justice.5" Walker, 624 P.2d at 690 (quoting Moonev v. Holohan. 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct.
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340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935)). As such, the Court announced that "if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury[,]" then
there is reason to reverse the conviction. Walker, 624 P.2d at 690, 692.
In its analysis, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the facts of the case, which
clearly demonstrated the State's reliance on false testimony for a conviction.
The false impression which the prosecution knowingly fostered in the
present case constitutes prosecutorial misconduct which seriously interfered
with the trial court's truth seeking function. We believe this to be analogous
to the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony and therefore subject to
the same standard of materiality used in those cases.
Walker, 624 P.2d at 691. As such, the Court found there existed a "reasonable
likelihood the false impression fostered by the prosecutor could have affected the
judgment of the jury." Walker, 624 P.2d at 691. Consequently, the conviction
was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Walker, 624 P.2d at 692.
Similar to the conduct of the prosecutor in Walker, Deputy County
Attorney Ryan Peters reliance on false testimony for a conviction substantially
impaired Defendant's right to a fair trial.

As illustrated, Mr. Peters was

unquestionably aware that Ms. Cuenca had reached a plea deal - one that he
approved. Mr. Peters, however, never corrected this falsehood, even after being
notified of it. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, as the Utah Supreme Court
did in Walker, that the failure to correct known false testimony is analogous to the
prosecution's knowing use of false testimony. 624 P.2d at 691. And because of
the nature of Ms. Cuenca's testimony, her false statements could have affected the
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judgment of the jury.

Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
Cumulatively, the State's failure to provide discovery under Rule 16 and its
misconduct by not correcting what was a blatant falsehood impaired Defendant's right to
a fair trial requires dismissal. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that this case be
dismissed. Or, in the alternative, the Defendant be afforded a new trial in accordance
with Walker and Gordon.

II.

The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Evidence of Doyle's Other Bad Acts
under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
Over Doyle's objection, two witnesses were allowed to testify as to her prior drug

use. First, Deputy Sheriff Dennis Chapman testified that on February 9, 2006—more
than 16 months prior to the execution of the search warrant on the Cuenca residence—he
initiated a traffic stop on Doyle where she was found to have methamphetamine in her
system and where she admitted to using methamphetamine recently. (R. 473: 271-74).
Second, Anna Shide, a forensic scientist, testified that she tested a blood sample collected
from Doyle on August 29, 2007—two months after the warrant—that was positive for
methamphetamine. (R. 473: 291-93). Doyle asserts that this testimony violates Rules
404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
"It is of course fundamental in our law that a person cap. be convicted only for acts
committed and not because of general character or proclivity to commit bad acts." State
v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, t 23, 8 P.3d 1025. Utah Courts have long recognized the
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prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence. Salt Lake City v. Struhs, 2004 UT App
489, Tl 14, 106 P.3d 188. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We do not doubt that
'evidence of prior convictions and other bad acts has tremendous potential to sway the
fmder of fact unfairly' and increases the likelihood of conviction." State v. Florez, 777
P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583, 584 (Utah 1984) (per
curiam) (Stating "[s]uch evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used with
extreme caution because of the prejudicial effect it may have on the finder of fact"). For
this reason there are "rigorous criteria" for admitting evidence of other crimes or wrongs
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d
1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988).
When analyzing admissibility of bad-acts evidence, a trial court must determine:
(1) whether evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character purpose; (2) whether
such evidence is relevant; and (3) whether evidence must be excluded as more prejudicial
than probative. Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404(b); State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 51, % 2, 88
P.3d 359 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, lj 20, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied, 528 U.S.
1164, 120S.Ct. 1181(2002)).
"Even if evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose and is relevant,
the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence i s substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,1f 20, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting Utah R. Evid.
403). Accordingly, even if Brown's prior conviction of retail theft had been offered for a
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proper purpose and was relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative under the third
prong of the analysis.
To be admissible, the prior bad act evidence "must have real probative value, not
just possible worth." United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 662 (10th Cir. 1987); United
States_y. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 612 (10th Cir. 1987). Even if the prior
conviction has real probative value, however, it is inadmissible if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs such probative value.

Moreover, when certain actions of a

current charge are similar to a previous conviction, unless those similarities are
"peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct" and not just of the type of crime
committed, the similarities between the two cannot be found to constitute a common
design or modus operandi. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1990).
The trial court denied Doyle's motion to exclude the above-referenced testimony
based upon the following:
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of the other bad acts to
establish character that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case.
Rather, the State is seeking to introduce the evidence for non-character purposes—
i.e., to show ownership or possession of the methamphetamine found in this case,
to establish that the items found mth the drags axe m fact drag paraphernalia (as
expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes.
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402
because it tends to make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter—the
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possession or ownership of the drugs—more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. See URCrP 401.
Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair
prejudicial effect.

The Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit

against the defendant is prejudicial, but Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice."
The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial and is therefore
proper.
(R. 242-240). Doyle asserts that the rationale behind the trial court ruling is exactly what
Rules 404(b) and 403 are designed to prohibit.
Doyle was charged with constructive possession of methamphetamine and
paraphernalia due to her presence at a residence where a search warrant was executed.
By the trial court's own admission, he admitted evidence of two other occasions where
Doyle

either

admitted

to

methamphetamine

use

and/or

tested

positive

for

methamphetamine precisely to prove that she possessed or owned the drugs at issue on
the date and time at issue in the trial. In other words, he admitted these other bad acts to
prove that Doyle on this occasion acted in conformity with these other two occasions.
This is in direct violation of Rule 404(b). Furthermore, "ownership or possession" is not
a purpose for which such evidence is allowed under Rule 404(b). Moreover, whether the
pipes or baggies were drug paraphernalia was not at issue. There was no argument that
those items were not paraphernalia.

In fact, those items, by their very nature were

unquestionably paraphernalia. The baggies had drugs inside and glass pipes have very
few if any legitimate uses—particularly not when residue is located inside.
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Additionally, any probative value of Doyle's drug use on other occasions is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court has
stated that evidence of other bad acts has "'tremendous potential to sway the finder of
fact unfairly' and increases the likelihood of conviction." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452,
459 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, several factors have been established to assist in the
determination of whether evidence of other crimes or bad acts should be excluded under
Rule 403. These include: (1) the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, (2) the similarities between the crimes, (3) the interval of time that has
elapsed between the crimes, (4) the need for the evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative
proof, and (6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); see also
Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at % 29, 993 P.2d 837, State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App.
1990). Doyle asserts that these factors clearly weigh against admission.
One, the only similarities between this alleged crime and the other bad acts are
that all of them involve methamphetamine. Neither of the other two acts involved
constructive possession or ownership, or a search warrant. Two, is the interval of time
that has elapsed between the incidences. Doyle's admission to Chapman of recent drug
use and that subsequent positive test for methamphetamine occurred more than sixteen
months prior to her presence at Cuenca's residence; and the other positive test took place
two months after. Three, the only true purpose of allowing testimony of Doyle's other
acts involving methamphetamine was to rouse the jury to overmastering hostility towards
her as a "drug addict."
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The trial court failed to establish a non-character purpose that would justify
admitting evidence of these other bad acts at trial. Indeed, the trial court's ruling clearly
establishes that this evidence was admitted to establish that because Doyle had used
methamphetamine on other occasions, she must have owned, possessed or used the
methamphetamine at issue here: Once a drug user, always a drug user.
Furthermore, the trial court did not carefully balance the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect. The trial court should have concluded that the
probative value of other acts was slight in comparison to the substantial prejudicial effect.
Because this error is such that there was a "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant in its absence," Doyles requests that this Court reverse her
conviction. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989).

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Johnson requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2 0 0 9 ^ - N

Michael Brown
Michael D. Esplin
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 30th day of November, 2009.

30

ADDENDA

31

JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, #7041
Utah County Attorney
TIMOTHY L. TAYLOR, #8001
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 851-8026
Fax:(801)851-8051

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW & ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
JULLYN DOYLE,

Case No. 071402824
JUDGE Darold J. McDade

Defendant.

This case is before the Court on the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Aaron Dodd
represented the defendant and Timothy Taylor represented the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On September 24 and 25, 2008, a jury trial was held wherein the defendant was
convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor.
2. On or about November 17, 2008, prior to the imposition of a sentence, the defendant
filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment. The defendant invoked two separate arguments in favor of his
Motion to Arrest Judgment: 1) That the State of Utah failed to provide exculpatory evidence after
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the defendant had filed a Specific Request for Discovery inquiring into any plea deals with the
co-defendant in the case, and; 2) that the State of Utah suborned perjury by failing to correct
alleged false testimony by a co-defendant.
3. On or about December 10, 2008, the State of Utah filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
4. On or about December 19, 2008, the defendant filed a Reply to State's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
5. On or about December 29, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Memorandum in
Response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
6. On January 12, 2009, the court received oral arguments from the parties.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
After reviewing the aforementioned documents and receiving arguments from the parties,
the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The Court finds that on or about November 15, 2007, the defendant filed a Specific
Request for Discovery asking the State to provide a copy of any agreements between the State
and the co-defendants in exchange for testifying against the defendant. At this point in the
proceedings, the State responded indicating, "To date, no offers have been made to any codefendants in exchange for testifying against this defendant."
2. On or about May 5, 2008, Shantel Cuenca "Cuenca", a co-defendant in the present
case, pled guilty in two unrelated cases. In case 081401078, Cuenca plead guilty to Distribution
2

of a Controlled Substance with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony and False Information to a
Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor. In case number 081401181, Cuenca pled guilty to
Possession of a Controlled Substance in Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony. As part of this
plea deal, Cuenca agreed to "testify against Jullyn Doyle and Jorge Navarrette-Lopez." Cuenca
waived time for sentencing and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison with the aforementioned
cases running concurrently with each other.
3. On or about September 12, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Response to
Defendant's Specific Request for Discovery as it related to any possible plea deal with the codefendant. In part, the State indicated, 'The State objects to this request due to the fact that the
items requested are not discoverable." The defendant did not objedt to the State's response
neither did it seek the State to compel with its discovery request.
4. The Court finds that upon receiving the State's objection to provide discovery, the
defendant could have objected or filed a Motion to Compel in order to discover the details of any
possible plea deal between Cuenca and the State. Therefore, the defendant was put on notice by
the State of a possible plea deal with Cuenca but the defendant failed to further address this issue
before the trial began. However, the Court also finds that any failure by the State to provide
information regarding a plea deal with the co-defendant was cured when defense counsel
thoroughly explored the details of Cuenca's plea deal during the trial by examining both Cuenca
and the Cuenca's legal counsel in front of the jury.
5. This Court specifically finds support for its decision in the case of State v. Bisner, 37
P.3d 1073, (Utah 2001). In this case the Utah Supreme Court stated
3

Despite the strictures imposed on prosecutors by this constitutional
duty of disclosure, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is
in the specific instance where there is discovery after trial, of
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to
the defense that reversal of a conviction for nondisclosure is required.
Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial,
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence,
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its
advantage during the trial but failed to do so.
Id at 1082-83. (emphasis in original).
Since the defendant learned of a possible plea deal before trial but also thoroughly
examined the details of the plea deal during the trial, this Court finds the State of Utah did not
fail to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence and the defendant's due process rights
were not violated.
6. The Court finds that the case of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), is
distinguishable to the case at hand due to the fact that the defendant in Napue did not discover
exculpatory evidence known by the prosecutor until after the case was completed. Therefore, the
Court finds that Napue is not controlling based on the facts in the present case.
7. The Court also finds that the State did not suborn perjury. "Perjury" is a "false material
statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement
previously made and he does not believe the statement to be true." Utah Code Ann. §76-8-502.
8. Shantel Cuenca was charged with a first degree felony and ultimately ended up
pleading to a first degree felony. The difference between the original charge and her plea was the
dismissal of a drug free zone which removed the penalty from a mandatory 5 years to life to a
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penalty of not less than 5 years to life. The Court finds that when Cuenca indicated she did not
receive a plea deal in exchange for her testimony, she may have believed she actually did not
receive a plea deal since she was still sentenced 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison. Since
Cuenca may have believed she did not receive a plea deal, the Court cannot conclude that the
State suborned perjury.
ORDER
Based on the aforementioned findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court finds
there is not a good cause to arrest judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby DENIED.

DATED this $0

day of

r^bruarij

, 2009.

4f cytrjUf J-

f

~*£t

B/Y Tlte COURT * *
DA-RROLD J, McDADE
/

Approved as to form,

Aaron P. Dodd
Attorney for Defendant
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JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, No. 7041
Utah County Attorney
RYAN V. PETERS, No. 10683
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 851-8026

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE PRIOR BAD ACTS
EVIDENCE

JULLYN DOYLE,

Case No. 071402824

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge Darold J. McDade

This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior
Bad Acts. Having been fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Motion is ripe for decision.
The State put the defendant on notice that it intends to introduce the following bad acts
evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) at trial:
1.

A 2006 DUI conviction wherein the defendant was convicted of driving while
under the influence of methamphetamine.

2.

Statements made by the defendant when she was arrested in 2006 for DUI to the
effect that she had consumed methamphetamine.
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3.

Toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing the presence of
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood.

4.

Toxicology report from an August 2007 arrest for DUI, showing the presence of
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood.

The defendant moved to exclude such evidence claiming the evidence is improper under Rule
404(b).
"In deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial
court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3)
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 813
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
The Court denies the defendant's motion based upon the following:
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of other bad acts to establish character
that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. Rather, the State is seeking to
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes-i.e., to show ownership or possession of the
methamphetamine found in this case, to establish that the items found with the drugs are in fact
drug paraphernalia (as expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes.
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 because it tends to
make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter-the possession or ownership of the
drugs-more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See URCrP 401.

2

Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any tanfair prejudicial effect The
Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but
Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice/' The Court finds that the evidence is not unfaiily
prejudicial and is therefore proper.
Therefore, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion to exclude the prior bad acts
mentioned in this order and the State may introduce the same at tri&l.
Dated this day:
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to det ermine r and that she has presented direct evidence —

2

no t IJList circumstantial., but direct evidence on the issue of

3

wh<Bther these crimes were committed by the defendant, and we

4

would ask the Judge -- the Court to allow the defendants to

5

weigh her credibility

6

THE COURT

7

MR

8

THE COURT

9
10

is

DODD

Anything else, Mr

Dodd9

No, your Honor
It would be the Court's finding that there

sufficient evidence to proceed

I'll deny the motion to

dismiss and the motion for a directe d verdicjt.
Your Honor, may I approach9

11

MR. DODD

12

THE COURT. Yes

13

MR. DODD

Your Honor, I have a serious matter to bring

14

to the Court' s attention today.

15

Shantel Cuenca.

16

she in fact had no deal from the State to testify against my

17

client.

18

false.

19

The State calls its witness

Shantel Cuenca testified on the stand that

Your Honor, that falls —

that testimony was entirely

Your Honor, I'm submitting a plea agreement that

20

Shantel Cuenca entered into the Court May 5th of 2008 in front

21

of your Honor, cind her attorney was Gunda Jarvis, who was

22

present.

23

receiving a beneficial plea from the State in exchange for

24

testimony from my client

25

That plea agreement states that in fact she is

Your Honor, this motion goes on to explain that under
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Nakua vs. Illinois, a United States Supreme Court case from

2

1959, citation 360 US 264, it's a due process violation, a

3

violation of my client's Constitutional Rights to a fair trial,

4

for the State to suborn perjury from its m a m witness.

5

Your Honor, I was hopeful that the State would correct

6

this testimony.

7

your Honor that the State would come back, explaining what was
going on.

9
10

I was hopeful this morning when we approached

I was advised to bring this to your attention at the

very beginning this morning; but I waited.

I waited to see if

the State was going to correct the false testimony today.

11

When the State called Ms. Cuenca back, I expected them

12

to put her on the stand and correct the false testimony that

13

was given.

It did not happen.

14

testimony.

Your Honor, she lied on the stand.

15

and she told the jury that she did not receive this —

16

from the State, and that was entirely false.

17

false.

18

She knew —

The State has not corrected her
She sat there
any deal

It was entirely

I can call Ms. Gunda to the stand --

19

Ms. Jarvis to the stand.

20

a deal from the State in exchange for testimony against my

21

client.

22

allowed that perjured testimony to go forward.

23

She knew, in fact, that she received

She perjured herself on the stand.

Your Honor, not only —

The State has

I mean, thi_s shouldn't even

24

go to the jury.

25

witness, tne one that really is f m a e r m g out, the only one

This should be dismissed.

The State's m a m
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that can finger out my client, whose testimony has since

2

changed -- she's changed her testimony, and that testimony has

3

changed from the time that she entered this plea deal.

4

Your Honor, if you recall, I subpoenaed Ms. Cuenca.

5

It was my understanding she was going to testify favorably all

6

along.

7

hearing.

8

she was favorable to my client.

9

this plea deal that she changed her testimony, and now she

10

I was the one that called Ms. Cuenca at the preliminary
I was the one that asked for the questions, because
It wasn't until she entered

points the finger at my client.

11

She has perjured herself.

The State has not corrected

12

that testimony.

13

testimony.

14

and the United States Supreme Court, as interpreting the

15

Constitution, demands that this case be dismissed.

16
17

The State has not attempted to correct that

It is a complete violation of my client's rights,

THE COURT: Is the State receiving this for the first
time?

18

MR. PETERS: Yes.

19

THE COURT: Do you need some time to look it over, or

20
21

do you want to respond now?
MR. PETERS: I can respond now.

Judge, it looks like

22

on the 11th of September 2008 the State filed a supplemental

23

response to the defendant's specific request for discovery.

24

In that, and I'll read it —

25

was not anticzpat 1 PC this motion.

I don't have copies because I
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The State says, "The State specifically objects to

2

item No. 2, hereinafter request No. 2 listed in the defendant's

3

specific request for discovery, wherein the defendant requested

4

a copy of any and all written and verbal offers to any co-

5

defendant in this case, in exchange for testimony against

6

the defendant.

7

defendant, please include the date, time that the offer was

8

provided, and the name of the person making that offer "

9

If any verbal offer was submitted to any co-

That was a request made by the defense well on early

10

in the case.

11

call Ms. Cuenca in this case; but when I did, in September, I

12

filed this objection to their request; and I believe it has

13

been filed with the Court.

14

due to the fact that the items requested are not discoverable.

15

The rules of discovery in a criminal case are laid out in the

16

Rules of —

17

I hadn't decided whether or not I was going to

"The State objects to this request

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16.

"Rule 6o(a) states the prosecutoi must disclose the

18

following material: statements of co-defendants or defendants,

19

criminal record of the defendant, physical evidence seized

20

from the defendant or co-defendants, exculpatory evidence, or

21

any other item which the Court finds good cause, the defendant

22

should have available.

23

in any of these specifically enumerated categories.

24

the State objects to defendant's discovery request No. 2."

25

The St-^e

1

Request No. 2 does not fall with any

^a-Jy objected to th: s request.

—

Therefore,

Now, when
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I asked Ms. Cuenca if she was given a deal on the stand, I

2

believe the testimony was, "What is your understanding of any

3

deal that took place 9 "

4

I can call Ms. Ragan, that when we were back discussing it with

5

her, that was what I requested, "What is your understanding of

6

the deal that you were given in this case, if any 9 "

7

response was, "Nothing.

8

I went to prison."

9

I am test -- I caq call officer Barson,

Her exact

I don't believe I was given anything.

I don't feel I was given anything.

I don't believe the State has suborn perjury in this

10

case.

We have clearly put the defendant on notice that we

11

weren't going to give him notice of any deals unless he brought

12

it to this Court's attention, which he did not, prior to trial.

13

September 11th, that was what, two -- two full weeks ago that

14

he's had plenty of time to do that.

15

That's what I'm trying to get to, Judge.

My question

16

to her was what was her understanding of a deal, if any, given.

17

That was certainly what the State intended.

18

deal was.

19

to call her attorney, which would violate attorney/client

20

privilege, because she obviously didn't understand what her

21

deal was.

22

that were involved in the case, and quite possibly this Court,

23

because she pled guilty in this Court and signed the plea

24

agreement in this Court.

25

It's not what the

In order to get that into evidence, I would have

I would also possibly have to call other attorneys

So I don't believe that the State has suborn perjury.
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Again, we have clearly put the defendant on notice that we were

2

not going to tell him what options we were, and we don't have

3

to unless he makes an objection prior to

4

the Court finds that there's good cause and forces us to do so

5

That has not taken place today, has not taken place prior to

6

today, and we would object to this motion to dismiss

7

MR

DODD

rial, a motion, and

Your Honor, the Court is required, under

8

the Rules of Evidence and under due process, under the State's

9

Rules of evidence as well, to provide to the defendant any

10

exculpatory information

11

my witness at the preliminary hearing

12

was intending to call her, because I subpoenaed her.

13

one that started the motion to get her here, to Court to this

14

trial

15

The State knows that I called her as

The State was well aware —

The State knows that I
I was the

because if you'll read

16

that plea agreement you'11 see which is the prosecutor that

17

signed that deal before your Honor

18

that is exculpatory information

19

objected to my request, that objection was not valid.

20

have to d" anything further, but that's missing the entire

21

point

22

deal, and she said, "No "

The State is aware that
Besides the fact that they
I didn't

The entire point is, Ryan Peters asked her if she got a
That was false testimony.

23

Did they ever tell me that that was false testimony9

24

I was waiting, I was hoping that they would tell me that that

25

wab false testimony, and I can bring i ..tnesses in to that fact,
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that I alerted other attorneys at my office of what was going

2

on, and I was concerned, and they were concerned, and thought

3

what should we do.

4

morning.

5

to do that.

6

mistake, and I was hopeful that they would.

7

They advised me to come to you this

I thought about it all last nigh):, and I didn't want
I wanted to give them the chance to clean up their

Your Honor, the jury has heard their key witness
perjure themselves, and the State did absolutely nothing.

9

was hopeful, I was anxious, and I asked on the sidebar, when

10

the State said that they were going to call Shantel Cuenca

11

again, I said,

12

her?"

13

something.

14

exactly right."

15

waiting for him to do it.

16

motion.

17

I

XN

Ryan, what's the purpose -- why are you calling

I was hoping for him to say,

VA

Hey, I've got to clear up

There was -- you know, some —

she didn't testify

I was hoping he was going to do it.

I was

That I wouldn't have to file this

Regardless of whether I was on notice or not, your

18

Honor, I checked the criminal background oif every one of these

19

co-defendants but Shantel Cuenca, previous to this trial.

20

didn't do it because she was my witness.

21

she had turned yesterday morning, when Mr. Peters told me,

22

know what, she changed her testimony; she's on our side now," I

23

had to call my secretary right then.

24

give me all of her criminal background right now, this instant,

25

any piea deals."

I

When I learned that
vv

You

I said, "You've got to
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He was able to come down and find one plea agreement

2

I don't know the status of the other cases that she entered

3

into, but he gave me that, and got a certified copy of it and

4

gave it to me

5

minute.

6

you a deal 9

7

testimony9

8

truthful9

9

deal 9 "

10

If you recall, I asked Ms. Cuenca, "Wait a

Are you sure 9

Are you sure the State is not giving

Are you sure you don't want to change your
Are you absolutely sure that your testimony is
You mean to tell me the State di_dn't give you any

I asked her, if you remember, several different ways.

11

We can pull it up on the testimony, on the record.

12

pull Mr. Peters guestions to her.

13

your understanding?"

14

"No."

15

—

16

I was forced to.

17

We can

It wasn't like "What's

It was, "Did the State give you a deal?"

I was incredibly reluctant to bring this motion, but I

and I gave the benefit of the doubt as much as I could, but
I couldn't do anything eJse.

Your Honor, if you want to take some time and read

18

through the case that I submitted from the United States

19

Supreme Court, I request that you do that.

20

really no other option but to dismiss this case.

I think you have

21

THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Peters?

22

MR. DODD: Your Honor, if I —

I would like to call

23

Ms. Jarvis to the stand, so she can testify regarding what she

24

informed her client in taking this deal.

25

MR

PETERS

Well, Ju H ge, I think that would cure the
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problem, that Mr. Dodd seems to believe is here, by being able

2

to impeach Ms. Cuenca through another witness.

3

defined -- and I can't find the exact section right now, your

4

Honor, but perjury is defined as a statement made in an

5

official proceeding that the witness believes to be false at

6

the time she makes it.

7

Perjury is

Again, I can call several witnesses that can say

8

that she did not believe that her statement was false.

9

don't believe perjury was committed here.

I

If the Court wants

10

to allow me a few moments to find the section for perjury,

11

and look at the elements, I can do that; but perjury was

12

not committed here.

13

what was in her knowledge.

14

committed.

15

She only has the ability to testify to
So I don't believe perjury was

Without perjury being committed -- whether or not the

16

fact is true or not, isn't the issue.

17

somebody lied about it.

18

says, is that you know what you're saying is false.

19

opportunity to question her several times.

20

statements, trying to hit it from every side to see if the

21

statement that she made she knew was false.

22

said, "No, I haven't been given a deal."

23

The fact is whether

The way you lie about it, the statute
He had the

As he says, several

She, every time,

Now, he's more than -- more than allowed to call

24

Ms. Jarvis to come to the stand and impeach her.

25

think that's an issue.

I don't

I'm not objecting to that; but the
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witness has to be able to testify from her own observations

2

of what she understands to be the case.

3

the State has done anything wrong in this case.

I don't believe that

4

THE COURT- Anything other than you've already said9

5

MR. DODD: Your Honor, in Napua vs. Illinois, just a

6

short summary of this case -- there's a much more serious case

7

than this, but again, this case reminds me of (inaudible) was a

8

murder case.

9

had already been convicted and put to death.

So a man's life was on the line

10

serious, but still, she's facing zero to five.

11

at stake.

12

A co-defendant
Granted, not as
Her liberty is

Just on the summary it states that a witness got up on

13

the stand and testified that he didn't get a deal.

14

get a deal from the State in exchange for his testimony.

15

was the same prosecutor that asked those questions that was the

16

one that gave him that deal.

17

your Honor.

18

He didn't
It

It's the exact same case here,

The same prosecutor that gave thjs witness the deal,

19

allowed the testimony to come out that, "No, I didn't get a

20

deal for exchange of my testimony.

21

truth.

22

truth."

23

point.

24
25

I'm tired of my T'ays.

I'm just here to tell the

I'm just here to tell the

This case is right on point.

It's strikingly on

I d o n ' t hear — I j u s t hear e x c u s e s .
xv

Oh, well

I j u s t hear,

maybe she d i d n ' t u n d e r s t a n d , " or - - he^ testimony i s
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what it is; and the ]ury clearly understood what her testimony

2

was.

" I didn't receive any consideration.

3

deal

m exchange for my testimony."

4

I didn' t receive a

If the Court needs to, your Honor, you're the one

5

that took the plea deal; and like every one you do, you follow

6

their crime.

7

repeat to them the plea deal that they're getting.

8

or defense Counsel puts on the record that this is in fact in

9

exchang e for testimony a gainst Jullyn Doyle, as it says.

10

It's a Rul e 11.

You ask if they understand.

She was charged with a first-degree case.

You

The State

She was

11

charged with possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted

12

person.

13

second-<degree felony, and other cases -- other charges were

14

dropped

15

client.

16

and the State allowed it to happen and did nothing to stop it.

17

These are serious charges.

It was reduced down to a

She got a deal in exchange for testimony against my
Simple as that, and she lied.

It was false testimony;

MR. PETERS: Judge, I would like to respond, because

18

Counsel has deemed it to ambush us with this at this point in

19

time, and we note that

20
21

—

MR. DODD: Your Honor, ambushed?

I'm the one that's

being ambushed.

22

THE COURT: Sit down, sit down.

23

MR. PETERS: —

that Counsel had plenty of opportunity

24

to take this and impeach Ms. Cuenca by himself.

25

called h^r on u*ie szand aid said, uiesterday you testified

He could have

j
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there was no deal.

2

signature?

3

to go the route of waiting until now to throw this on us.

4
5

What does it say the deal is?"

Is that your
Yet no, he decides

THE COURT: He can argue his case the way he chooses to
argue his case.

6
7

Do you recognize this?

MR. PETERS: I agree, but I think I ought to be able to
respond.

Second of all, Judge --

8

THE COURT: I asked you before if you needed some time

9

to take to respond, and you said, "No, I'll go ahead and do it

10

right now."

11

So that's your response.

MR. PETERS: Can I have an opportunity to look at that?

12

Because there were two cases that Ms. Cuenca pled guilty in

13

that day

—

14

THE COURT: What do you need to look at?

15

MR. PETERS: The plea agreement, because it is my

16

recollection that she pled to a first-degree felony in a

17

separate case.

18

(Counsel conferring off the record)

19

MR. PETERS: This doesn't include the other case.

20

Perhaps I should rethink my response and ask that we be able to

21

go down and get the other case to show that she did plea to a

22

first-degree felony.

23

felony.

24
25

She was charged with a first-degree

She pled to a first-degree felony.
Now, in full disclosure to the Court, it was a first-

degree felony that required, I think —

well, before saying
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that, I better look at the plea agreement, if I could have

2

take back and have some time to pull the other plea agreement9

3

THE COURT. I don't have a problem with that

You can

4

go ahead and take what time you need to figure out what you

5

want to do.

6

and look at 11:30.

7

that, make the request; but for now, 11:30, okay 9

8

recess.

9

The motion is on the table.

—

Vfe'll take a recess

If you need a little bit more time than
Be in

COURT BAILIFF: All rise.

10

(Recess taken)

11

THE COURT: Okay, we're back on the record. Mr. Peters,

12

did you want to make an additional response to the motion to

13

dismiss?

14

MR. PETERS: Yes, Judge.

I have here a certified copy

15

of a plea deal that was reached simultaneously with the only

16

one that the Judge has provided, interestingly enough.

17

plea deal, Ms. Cuenca pled guilty to a first-degree felony.

18

She was charged with a first-degree felony, and she pled guilty

19

to a first-degree felony.

In that

In addition, on that plea deal it says the maximum

20

—

21

the minimum, max to -- punishment, five to J^ife in prison.

22

sure the Court can recall, and we can recall the tape if

23

possible, that Ms. Cuenca, when she was on the stand said, "As

24

close as I can remember, I didn't get anything.

25

life."

I'm

I got five to

Seems to be quite consistent with th,e simultaneous plea
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deal that was entered into, I believe the exact same day.

2

me just check the dates for that, your Honor.

3

I think that Mr

Let

Dodd clearly questioned her on the

4

issue of whether or not she got concurrent sentencmgs, and in

5

my view I think it was established that she did get concurrent

6

sentencing, which is I guess a plea deal of sorts, and that was

7

on the record.

8

So Judge, it's not that far of a stretch for a person

9

who's charged with a first-degree felony and pleads to a first-

10

degree felony, and who knows that she's getting five to life to

11

say, "I didn't get a deal."

12

actually a first-degree felony that required some mandatory

13

prison time.

14

drug-free zone with a prior.

15

charges requires mandatory prison time.

16

years.

Now, for the record, it was

She was charged with distribution of meth in a
That particular combination of
I believe it's

seven

I'm not sure on that.

17

The State did agree to not —

to drop the drug-free

18

zone, which didn't change the charge.

It was still a first-

19

degree felony, because she had a prior djstribution, and it

20

brought the mandatory prison from seven years down to five

21

years.

22

earlier.

23

Five to life, precisely what Ms. Cuenca testified to

The only —

and I believe I've given the Court a

24

certified copy, as well as Mr. Dodd —

25

think Mr. Dodd's copy is certified.

I

or a copy.

I don't

I believe that there's a
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lot going on here, and that when a person pleads guilty to a

2

first-degree felony and a second-degree felony, and they run it

3

concurrent, and she's given five years to live in prison as the

4

sentence on that, and then she comes and testifies, "I didn't

5

get anything, I pled to what I was charged with," I don't think

6

is a stretch to believe that she believed that she pled to

7

what she was charged with

8

any sort of degree.

9

precisely what's in the plea agreement.

10

It wasn't reduced in any kind

—

The prison time that she understood is

Judge, I don't think there's a clear case of perjury

11

here; and because of that, I would ask that the motion to

12

dismiss be denied.

13

THE COURT: Do you want this motion filed then?

14

MR. DODD: Yes.

Your Honor, as I mentioned before, in

15

maybe a little more detail, you know, I went to bed last night

16

with a heavy heart, not knowing what to do about this.

17

Counsel's asserting —

18

attempted to mislead you by only giving you one document.

19

I only supplied your Honor with one statement, and that I left

20

out the statement that Shantel Cuenca has given to you.

21

Now

seems to be asserting that I've
That

Your Honor, as I discussed yesterday, yesterday

22

morning I fully expected Shantel Cuenca to testify favorably

23

to my client

24

secretary Daniel Price, and said, "Daniel, I need you to look

25

up and see if she has any other convictions, and I need you to

When I found out that was not so, I called my
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look up and find out if she has any plea agreements with the

2

State, and I need it now/'

3

He came down and he found one, the one I handed you.

4

He said, "This is all I could find "

5

other stuff, but I, you know, didn't get Jt." That's all I

6

had.

7

deal was

8
9

He said, "There's some

I didn't know if there was -- I didn't know what the

He just said that she pled guilty to a second degree,
and that she was —

m

exchange for testimony.

I didn't know

10

what the original charges was, I didn't know what other —

11

said she has some other felony convictions.

12

the deals were.

13

got any sentencing, concurrent or consecutive, because I didn't

14

know.

15

she was going to testify truthfully.

16

I didn't know what

So I asked her on the stand whether or not she

I was asking her, trying to prod her memory to see if

Now, the State asserts, "Well, it's not really a

17

deal, your Honor.

18

lie, because, hey, look, she pled to a first-degree five to

19

life.

20

a deal, and you know, we didn't even drop any charges."

21

is untrue.

22

he

So she really wasn't telling the jury a

She's in prison for a long time.

We didn't give her

Charges were dropped on this one.

That

I've been since

23

able to look at it, looked it up.

Charges on this, they

24

dropped a paraphernalia charge on this one, they dropped drug-

25

free zone language.

On the other case I did hand you, it was
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pled down from a first-degree.

2

night, and see what was there, what charges were there.

I was able to see that last

3

Ludicrous to assert that I'm trying to —

4

to assert that I'm trying to give you false information by

5

only giving you one plea agreement.

6

they've given, what does it say9

7

Count I.

8

"I will plead to Count III."

9

dismissed.

It's amended.

or seem

This plea agreement that

The State agrees to amend

Obviously it's a lesser charge.
The remaining counts will be

"The State agrees to recommend that we proceed

10

with sentencing today."

11

then.

"I agree to testify against Jullyn Doyle," May 5th, same

12

date.

Testimony changed.

13

State allowed her to be sentenced

It can't be any clearer. Whether or not she understood

14

it, I'm ready to call Ms. Jarvis, and I request to call her.

15

The jury clearly heard, though, clearly heard from Ms. Cuenca,

16

"I'm here of my own free will and choice.

17

citizen and I'm telling you that Jullyn Doyle smoked meth,"

18

change of testimony.

19

this."

"No State didn't give me a deal for

These documents prove otherwise.

20

I'm just a good

They prove otherwise

21

that she was given a deal in exchange to testify against Jullyn

22

Doyle.

23

Ms

Request to be able to call

Jarvis to the stand to testify.

24
25

How much clearer can it be?

THE COURT: You can call Ms. Jarvis when the jury comes
back m .

That's your case, not before me.

If you want to
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impeach Ms. Cuenca, you need to do that in front of the jury

2

MR. DODD: I —

3

THE COURT: —

4

MR. DODD: -- certainly request that, your Honor, but

—

not before the Court.

5

the State is alleging that somehow Cuenca didn't think she was

6

getting a deal.

7

testify of what she does --

I'd like to call Ms. Jarvis to be able to

8

THE COURT: You can do

9

MR. DODD: —

10

THE COURT: —

—

with every one of her clients.
that before the jury.

You're asking me

11

to make a finding of fact in a case that the jury hasn't heard

12

your side.

13

MR. DODD: No, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: As far as the argument you're making

15

MR. DODD: I'm asking you

16

THE COURT: —

17

—

—

if you want to impeach Ms. Cuenca, you

need to do it in front of the jury.

18

MR. DODD: I'm not asking to impeach Ms. Cuenca.

19

I'm asking to present evidence to this Court that there was

20

perjury.

21

THE COURT: I don't find misconduct on the part of the

22

State, number one.

Whether or not she committed perjury is an

23

issue for the jury to hear.

24

my finding.

25

as well as the State, to pick up discovery.

You made your arguments.

That's

As far as discovery goes, you have that ability,
That's the bottom
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line.

2

Your motion, I read through it carefully.

3

case.

4

case hadn't been tried.

5

this motion in the middle of the case.

6

Ms. Cuenca, do it in front of the ]ury.

7

fact.

8
9

The case involved a post conviction motion
This is different.

I read the
The whole

You're bringing in

If you want to impeach
They're the finders of

MR. DODD: Your Honor, xn the alternative I'll move for
a mxstrial due to prosecutorial misconduct.

10

THE COURT: Denied.

11

MR. DODD: Thank you.

12

THE COURT: You motion to dismiss is also denied.

13

MR. DODD: Thank you.

14

THE COURT: Do we need to take a break, or do we need

15

to —

how many —

can you present your ne,xt witness, Mr. Dodd,

16

wxthin the next 40 mxnutes?

17

take a lunch break, or do you need —

18

lunch now and come back?

Can we get that done before we
should we just take a

19

MR. DODD: I think we should take a lunch break now.

20

THE COURT

21

MR. PETERS: I would request the same.

22

THE COURT: All right.

23

then, for lunch.

24

for €everybody?

25

Okay.

We'll go ahead and recess,

Let's return at

MR. DODD: Yes.

— is 1 or clock enough time

